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ARTICLES
THE PERILS OF FORGETTING
FAIRNESS
Michael B. Dorff and Kimberly Kessler FerzanW
A physicist, a chemist, and an economist are shipwrecked on
a desert island. Starving, they find a case of canned pork and
beans on the beach, but they have no can opener. So, they
hold a symposium on how to open the cans. The physicist
goes first:
"I've devised a physical solution. We find a pointed rock and
propel it at the lid of the can at, say, 25 meters per second-"2
The chemist breaks in:
"No, I have a chemical solution: we heat the molecules of the
contents to over 100 degrees Centigrade until the pressure
builds to-"2
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The economist, condescension dripping from his voice,
interrupts:
"Gentlemen, gentlemen, I have a much more elegant solution.
Assume we have a can opener... "
That's funny. But now consider our addition of the newest
participant in the symposium on the island: the legal economist. The
legal economist argues that the pork and beans should be distributed
in a wildly controversial way, ultimately arguing that this is the most
efficient distribution of the goods. He advocates the creation and
destruction of legal structures in the name of maximizing the
happiness of all who love pork and beans. His ideas are creative.
They are controversial. They are counterintuitive. But, he says, they
are welfare maximizing.
But there's a problem: there is no can opener. And there's just
nothing funny about the legal economist.
One significant problem with legal economists' methodology is
that they believe that they are entitled to the same assumptions that
economists are. That is, they are entitled to extract out difficult
variables in making their calculations. They are entitled to make
certain types of assumptions. But they are not.
Legal economists make far reaching and extraordinarily visible
policy prescriptions. They seek to influence the law. They seek to
change the law. And thus, they are not entitled to ignore the elephants
in the room, nor are they entitled to any can opener presumptions.
Specifically, they are not entitled to ignore fairness concerns.
In recent years, economists have made some controversial
proposals, and here are just a handful: execute minors,2 punish the
innocent,3 settle cases by lottery,4 allow women to sell their babies,'
permit racial discrimination,6 and allow insider trading.7 Legal
I Daily Dose of Optimism: Economist Joke, http://ddo.typepad.com/ddo/2005/09/
economiistjoke.html (last visited May 12, 2009).
2 Momn A. Yahya, Deterring Roper's Juveniles: Using a Law and Economics Approach
to Show that the Logic of Roper Implies that Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More than
Adults, I1I1 PENN. ST. L. REv. 53 (2006) (executing minors).
3Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Punishing the Innocent Along with the Guilty:
The Economics of Individual versus Group Punishment, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 81 (2007) (group
punishment).
4 James D. Miller, Using Lotteries to Expand the Range of Litigation Settlements, 26 J.
LEGAL STuD. 69 (1997) (settling disputes by lottery).
5Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
6 RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
7Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
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economists have argued that each of these activities should be
legalized in the service of welfare maximization. Indeed, these are
just a few of the legions of contrarian proposals advanced by legal
economists as efficient. Such proposals are at least counterintuitive,
and perhaps even shocking. Economists argue that people's intuitive
reactions to proposed legal rules are irrelevant; all that matters is
efficiency. But in searching for welfare-maximizing policy proposals,
the authors of these works have overlooked the negative externalities
that also accompany avant-garde positions. Legal rules that strike
most people as unjust may upset community expectations and
undermine the efficiency of the very rules proposed. In short, such
rules may not prove welfare maximizing at all.
In this Article, we argue that legal economists' failure to
include people's preferences for fairness undermines their policy
prescriptions, even by economists' own consequentialist standards.
The assumptions that may be acceptable for an economist are simply
impermissible for the legal economist. It is important to note that this
Article is not another contribution to either the behavioral law and
economics movement or the growing scholarship on happiness.
Rather, our claim is far simpler and far more pronounced: Fairness
counts as a preference. And forgetting that fairness counts will have
drastic ramifications with respect to welfare-maximizing abilities of
the very law and legal system that the legal economist hopes to
influence. Part I discusses three prominent counterintuitive proposals
from legal economists. Our purpose here is not to engage the authors'
arguments in detail, but rather to provide a context for the rest of our
discussion. Part 1I discusses the relationship between welfare and
fairness. Here, we discuss the empirical evidence of people's
preferences for fair rules and argue that, given this evidence, it is
methodologically unacceptable for legal economists to fail to include
(and to give sufficient weight to) these preferences within their
calculations. Part III discusses the likely costs of actually adopting
rules that are broadly perceived as surprising and unfair. We point out
that such rules are likely to defeat reasonable expectations, instigate
resistance, and undermine the overall legitimacy of the legal system.
As a result, we believe these proposals fail even on their own
welfare-maximizing terms.
REv. 857 (1983).
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1. A FEW SALIENT EXAMPLES
Law and economics literature is rife with examples of proposals
that would strike most non-economists as unfair, immoral, or at least
unexpected. In this section, we highlight a few prominent examples to
concretize the phenomena and ground our subsequent discussion.
Specifically, we discuss the recommendations to legalize baby
selling, racial discrimination, and insider trading.
A. Baby Selling
In 1978, Richard Posner and Elisabeth Landes proposed that baby
selling (their term, not ours) be legalized . They argued that creating
an open and legal market permitting an adoptive parent to pay a
natural mother for the right to adopt her child would have numerous
positive effects. Paying mothers for their children would reduce the
number of abortions, eliminate the shortage of babies available for
adoption, and decrease the number of unadopted children kept in
foster care. 9 Their article employed sophisticated mathematical
modeling and statistical data to bolster their argument that legalizing
baby sales would produce these beneficent policy outcomes.
Posner and Landes acknowledged that many people would
consider a market in children "undesirable."' 0 They cited
commentators who referred to such a market as "dealings in human
flesh" and a "taint on civilized society."" They also admitted that
permitting natural parents to sell their children might "smack of
slavery"'12 and produce "moral outrage."' 3 But they argued that these
objections were not well-founded. Unlike slaves, children sold
through their system would retain the protections of legal prohibitions
on child abuse and neglect, though these protections might admittedly
prove inadequate.'14 Also, while a market system would not screen
parents for suitability the way the current system does, they doubted
the value of such screening and proposed requiring some "minimal
background investigation" for buyers in the baby market, a sort of
driver's license for baby purchasers.'15 Landes and Posner took
comfort in their faith that people do not generally buy expensive
8Landes & Posner, supra note 5.
9 Id. at 325, 327.
10 Id. at 339.
11 Id.
12 Id at 344.
1" Idat 345.
14Id at 343.
13 Id.
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items in order to damage them, analogizing adoption of a child to the
purchase of a television set. 16
Perhaps their most telling point is their analysis of the likely costs
of babies in the newly legalized market. Although the black market
for babies resulted in very high prices, they argued that in a legal
market babies would be relatively affordable. 17 They had several
supportive arguments, but the most interesting for our purposes
involved the amount necessary to compensate the natural mother for
giving up her baby rather than aborting the pregnancy or raising the
child herself. Landes and Posner contended that the net cost in this
category would be quite low because the costs to the natural mother
would be substantially identical to those saved by the adoptive mother
in not bearing a child herself.18 Although this theory might have some
validity when applied to medical costs,19 we think most mothers
would find quite surprising the proposition that the amount they
would demand to give up their children consists mostly of the medical
costs they incurred during pregnancy and birth. The emotional toll of
giving up a baby is not a cost the adoptive mother would face if she
bore the child. The authors also fail to account for society's parallel
abhorrence at the selling of human beings. Landes and Posner' s
argument highlights the problem we are illustrating-that legal
economists frequently ignore most people's feelings about what
the law should be. This tendency may have sharply deleterious
consequences, as we argue below.
B. Racial Discrimination
In his landmark book, Forbidden Grounds'20 Richard Epstein
relied on economic arguments to explain why the laws prohibiting
racial discrimination in employment should be repealed .2' Epstein
claimed that laws prohibiting racial discrimination actually harm
racial minorities (along with everyone else) and that repealing these
laws would benefit everyone. 2 Epstein premised his case on the
notion that discrimination may sometimes reduce agency costs and
16 Id
17 Id. at 339-41.
18 Id at 340.
19 Even when applied to medical costs, we actually doubt the theory's validity.
Presumably, mothers giving up their children would tend to be of much lower economic status
than adopting mothers, and therefore much less likely to have adequate medical insurance.
20 EPSTEiN, supra note 6.
21 Epstein also argued against laws prohibiting gender, age, and disability discrimination.
Id at 9.
22 Id. at 57-75.
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therefore prove efficient.2 Governance costs rise as the tastes of the
firm's members and employees diverge.2 One way to reduce agency
costs and promote harmony within the firm, then, is to hire employees
with similar tastes.2 Employees who share the same tastes in music,
Epstein illustrated, will not quarrel over what type of music to play in
a common workspace.2 Finding workers with similar tastes will often
result in hiring a disproportionate number of some particular racial
minority, whose members may be more likely to share some tastes
than the components of a more diverse group.2
Another way to reduce agency costs is to recruit through a third
party referrer who implicitly bonds the workers' performance.2 For
an example, Epstein drew on the case of the Daniel Lamp Company.2
The Daniel Lamp Company established relationships with two
Hispanic groups, the Spanish Coalition and the Latino Youth
Organization, which each recommended unskilled workers for
employment .30 The organizations then had a vested interest in
ensuring that the workers they recommended were of high quality,
since otherwise the company would stop trusting them for referrals
and they would lose a valuable opportunity for their members .3 1 This
system resulted in cheap bonding for the workers and an inexpensive
source of reliable labor, helping to maximize the company's
earnings.3 The system also resulted in the company hiring mostly
Hispanic workers and commensurate liability under the
antidiscrimination laws.3
Finally, Epstein pointed out that if bigots concentrated themselves
in firms that discriminated against racial minorities, firms that did not
discriminate would end up relatively bigot-free.3 Without the
interference of antidiscrimination laws, this would be likely to occur.
Bigots would likely seek out firms that discriminated, since they
strongly preferred to avoid contact with racial minorities. By means
of the bigots' self-selection, firms that did not discriminate would
have few bigots, even if the companies themselves were indifferent as
23 Id at 59-65.
24 Id. at 66-67.
25 Id
26 Idat 61-62.
27 Id at 63-65.
28 Id at 70-7 1.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 70.
31 Id at 70-71.
32 Idat 71.
33 Id at 70-7 1.
34 Id at 74.
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to whether their employees were bigots .35 Firms without bigots should
be easier to manage and therefore face lower governance costs.36
Epstein fully understood that his proposal was alarming. On the
very first page of his book he stated, "[tlhere is little question that a
broad antidiscrimination principle lies at the core of American
political and intellectual understandings of a just and proper society,
not only in employment but also in housing and public
accommodations, medical care, education, indeed in all areas of
public and private life."3 He reiterated this point several times in
different ways, stating that the antidiscrimination statutes command
"6enormous support" from U.S. elites,38 quoting President George
Herbert Walker Bush vilifying discrimination as a "'fundamental evil
that tears at the fabric of our society,' 3 9 and claiming that even as
strong and independent an institution as the United States Supreme
Court could not "withstand the pounding that would result if it
undertook a frontal assault on the basic antidiscrimination norm.'AO
Nevertheless, he concluded that the antidiscrimination statutes should
be repealed .41 Discrimination should be legal because it was often
rational and efficient.4
C Insider Trading
Dennis Carlton and Daniel Fischel, in an article published in the
Stanford Law Review, argued that insider trading should be
legalized.4 Carlton and Fischel acknowledged that many consider
insider trading unfair,"4 but concluded that the practice was efficient
nonetheless.4 They argued that insider trading would, at least in some
35 Id. at 68.
36 Id. at 74-75.
37 Id. at 1.
38 Idat 3.
39 Id (quoting Veto message of President George Bush, Oct. 22, 1990).
40 Id at 6.
41 Id. at 9 (advocating the repeal of Title V11 as it applies to private employers operating in
competitive markets without legal protections against new entries).
42 Id. at 68-69.
43 Carlton & Fischel, supra note 7. They are certainly not alone. For two of the most
famous examples, see Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable
Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 718-19 (1980) (asserting that permitting insider trading
would result in more accurate securities prices); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law
Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 565-76 (1970) (same).
44 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C 907, 912 (1961) (referencing concern that
uninformed may be exploited); Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary
Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1982) (stating that the rule's
acceptance rests in intuition that insider trading is unfair); Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets:
Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REv. 117, 124-25 (1982) (arguing that
insider trading violates fairness goals).
45 Carlton & Fiachel, supra note 7, at 858, 880-82.
60320091
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cases, promote more accurate securities prices.4 Insider trading
provides an alternative avenue of communication from the firm to
investors.4 When the market detects insiders trading, it adjusts the
company's stock price accordingly, bidding the price up higher if
insiders are buying and reducing the price if insiders are selling.48 The
end result, under ideal conditions, may approach the effect of actually
disclosing the inside information.4 Companies may prefer to disclose
through insider trading for a number of reasons, such as when
disclosure would destroy the value of the information (such as the
presence of oil under land the company is considering buying) or
when the information is uncertain and the company wishes to avoid
liability for a false disclosure if the information turns out to be
incorrect.50 Accurate pricing is efficient for a number of reasons, but
chiefly because correct prices permit investors to reduce their
investments by discovering improperly valued securities. 1
Carlton and Fischel also contended that insider trading would
52constitute a more efficient way to compensate and hire managers.
Shareholders desire compensation schemes that will induce managers
to seek out and implement high expected value opportunities.53
Legalizing insider trading may produce the correct incentives. 4
Insider trading rewards managers who discover good opportunities
and put them into effect by permitting them to trade in advance of
public knowledge of the company's imminent success." Insider
trading may prove a cheaper method of incentivizing managers than
renegotiating each time a corporate opportunity arises or structuring
complicated incentives contracts ex ante.5 In addition, insider trading
may turn out to be a valuable screening tool in selecting managers
who will work hard and will take efficient levels of risks.5 Because
insider trading rewards hard-working managers who create profitable
opportunities for the corporation, only such managers should be
willing to accept insider trading as a substantial component of their
46 Id at 865--68.
47 Id at 868.49 Id./
49 Id
50 Id
51 Id at 866-67.
52 Id at 869-72.
53 Id. at 869-71.
54 Id. at 870-71.
55 Id
56 Id
57 Idat 871-72.
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compensation."8 These are precisely the managers corporations
generally want to hire.5 9
Carlton and Fischel acknowledged that insider trading might not
always be efficient for every corporation .60 They discussed numerous
concerns that might render insider trading disadvantageous for some
companies in some circumstances, such as the moral hazard problem
and issues concerning disclosure timing.61 The inherent unfairness of
insider trading to non-insider market participants, however, received
short shrift. In a few short paragraphs, the authors argued that if
insider trading is efficient, and therefore increases the total resources
to be divided, then it benefits both insiders and outsiders as a class.6
In other words, because insider trading makes cven outsidcrs
wealthier than they would be without insider trading, the practice
cannot be unfair.
These three examples-baby selling, employment discrimination,
and insider trading-highlight the tendency of legal economists
to treat fairness concerns as largely irrelevant to their policy
recommendations. In our view, they assume the can opener. As we
argue below, fairness preferences are part of welfare calculation and
cannot be ignored by legal economists who wish to influence the law.
11. WELFARE AND FAIRNESS
In this section, we introduce a methodological difficulty: legal
economists discount people's preferences for fairness, at most
mentioning that their proposals run contrary to these tastes. We argue
that there is robust empirical evidence of people's preference for
fairness and that this preference cannot be ignored in legal
economists' welfare calculations.
A. Fairness as a Preference
Within welfare economics, an actor's concern for fairness is
simply one preference among others. Hence, to the extent that citizens
express a preference for fairness, this preference-like preferences for
money or happiness-must be taken into account. Some welfare
economists label this preference for fairness a "taste for a notion of
fairness."6
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 861-66.
61 id. at 872-82.
62 Id at 880-82.
63 As described by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, individuals may have "a taste for a
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For our purposes here, we will use the term "fairness" as a rough
proxy for other-regarding preferences that deviate from the
presumption that individuals prefer those things in their rational
pecuniary self-interest. That is, individuals may have fairness
preferences in equality and proportionality, but they may also be
motivated by altruism or envy.64
Because this Article is an internal critique of law and economics,
we will take seriously the claim that fairness concerns are simply
preferences. But before doing so, we wish to note two ways in which
fairness may be more than simply a preference.
First, welfare economists must make initial determinations about
how to aggregate preferences. Does everyone count? Does everyone
count equally? These questions cannot be answered without making
value judgments. Moreover, a selection among distributive
approaches will have an effect on the outcome of the social welfare
function. For example, a decision to count everyone's preferences
equally yields a very different result than counting only the
preferences of white males. Crucially, the decision between these
possibilities must be made by a criterion outside of the welfare
counting mechanism itself. Welfare economists must therefore make
a critical decision-how to aggregate social welfare--on the basis of
some value other than efficiency (such as "fairness") in order to
perform any economic analysis.6
Second, many theorists believe that fairness concerns may trump
otherwise welfare-maximizing rules. In the hypothetical case
"Surgeon, ,6a surgeon seeks to cut up one healthy individual and
distribute his organs to five sick individuals.6 Theorists argue that
even if this rule were welfare maximizing,6 cutting up one individual
notion of fairness, just as they may have a taste for art, nature, or fine wine." Louis KAPLOW &
STEVEN SH-AVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 21 (2002).
64 For an empirical attempt to distinguish among these preferences, see Jeremy Clark,
Fairness in Public Good Provision: An Investigation of Preferences for Equality and
Proportionality, 31 CANADIAN J. ECON. 708 (1998).
65 On these points, see generally Michael B. Dorfl, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A
Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (2002).
66 See Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985), reprinted
in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 94, 95 (William Parent ed.,
1986).
67 For the argument that such a rule would not he Pareto superior, see Kimberly Kessler
Ferzan, Some Sound and Fury from Kaplow and Shavell, 23 LAW & PHIL. 73, 82 (2004).
68 That is, assuming that this would not lead to great social instability and so forth (the
very repercussions we discuss below).
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would be impermissible because doing so would be appropriating
him.69
At this point, however, we would like to put these two (substantial)
concerns to the side. For the remainder of this Article, we will try to
assess the strength of the "taste for fairness" and argue that, even
when fairness is viewed as a taste, economists are paying too little
attention to how this taste may undermine not only the legal rule that
they are proposing but also the legal regime as a whole.
B. Evidence of the Preference for Fairness
A thorough empirical calculation must include all factors that
could influence the result. Of course, some factors may not be
statistically significant and, depending upon one's discipline and the
need for exact calculations, some factors may be ignored. However,
the mere lip service that is given to the taste for fairness within the
legal economist's typical empirical conclusions is utterly
unacceptable. The taste for fairness is pervasive, and the preference
for fairness is very strong.
At the outset, we note that we do not need to rely on empirical
studies to make this claim. The taste for fairness is patent within our
society. Children complain if a rule is "unfair," but not if it is
inefficient. We teach our children what it means to deserve praise and
blame. And, we teach our children not to discriminate against people
of different sexes, races, or religions; to believe that humans may not
be bought or sold; and to value fair play. We should not be surprised,
then, that when these children grow to adulthood they continue to
take fairness values seriously.
However, we can make our case beyond even these obvious
observations. The taste for fairness runs deep. Consider first the
capuchin monkey.7 Scientists conducted tests in which they gave
capuchins food in exchange for rocks.7 ' Capuchins like cucumbers
and happily exchange rocks for cucumbers .7 ' However, capuchins
prefer grapes to cucumbers. 73 (Who wouldn't?) During the test, the
scientists gave some of the monkeys grapes for rocks, and gave other
monkeys cucumbers for rocks .74 The cucumber-receiving monkeys
69 Larry Alexander, Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the Paradigmatic Justification, 24
LAW &PHIL. 611, 615-16 (2005).
70 See Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B.M. de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 425
NATURE 297 (2003).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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stopped exchanging the rocks for food or refused to eat the
cucumber-"- a directly accessible food that they readily accept and
consume under almost any other set of circumstances."7 From this,
the researchers concluded that capuchins "measure reward in relative
terms, comparing their own rewards with those available, and their
own efforts with those of others.",76 Thus, to a monkey, it is not
simply about how many rewards one may receive, but how well off
one is compared to others.
Among human beings, the scientific documentation of the taste for
fairness is robust. Individuals have tastes for fairness that run contrary
to rational actor assumptions. One study asked individuals how
tickets should be distributed in a case in which demand exceeded
supply. 77 The subjects' clear order of preferences was standing in line,
then a lottery, then an auction.7 Of course, economic predictions run
in the exact opposite order-favoring auctions (he who values the
ticket most will pay most) and disfavoring lines (which are wasteful).
Perhaps the most famous endorsement of fairness is the ultimatum
game.7 In the ultimatum game, two subjects are told that they will
split a sum of money. One subject proposes how the two will split the
money. The second subject then either accepts or rejects the offer. If
the offer is accepted, the money is split according to the offer's terms.
If the offer is rejected, neither subject receives anything. Purely
rational actors in the proposing role would offer a split in which the
offeror receives nearly all the money and the offeree receives next to
nothing. Purely rational offerees would accept these offers because
even very little money is better than nothing. Each subject plays the
game only once, so there are no incentives to cooperate stemming
from a repeat play strategy.
In a result surprising only to economists, across many cultures
offerors often propose a roughly even split (around 40 percent on
average), and offerees faced with drastically unfair proposals
frequently reject the offer.8 In other words, the ultimatum game
15 Idat 298.
76 Id at 299.
77 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions
of Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285, S287 (1986).
78 Id at S288.
79 See Werner Guth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367 (1982); J. Neil Bearden, Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments:
The State of the Art 3-4 (Dec. 18, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract--626 183.
80 Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments
in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. EcoN. REv. 73 (2001); Hessel Oosterbeek et al.,
Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence From a Meta-Analysis, 7
EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 171 (2004) (although exact percentages vary quite a bit, the average of
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demonstrates robustly that people willingly sacrifice their pecuniary
self-interest to promote other values such as fairness.
These are but a few of the empirical studies that clearly
demonstrate that individuals have a strong preference for fairness.
Indeed, this preference is sometimes stronger than any preference
individuals have to act in their rational self-interest. Because
individuals weigh fairness so heavily, any policy that seeks to
enhance their welfare must take account of their fairness preferences.
C Responses to Fairness
Given the empirical evidence of the taste for fairness, one
should expect that fairness significantly figures into social welfare
calculations made by legal economists. This, however, is not the case.
Rather, legal economists seem to adopt one of two strategies. Some
have simply ignored it. Others have attempted to explain fairness
away.
More often than not, fairness is simply ignored. As Daniel
Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, have noted:
The economic agent is assumed to be law-abiding but not
'fair" -if fairness implies that some legal opportunities for
gain are not exploited. This nonfaimess assumption expresses
a resistance to explanations of economic actions in moral
terms that has deep roots in the history of the discipline. The
central insight that gave rise to modern economics is that
the common good is well served by the free actions of
self-interested agents in a market.'
As Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler note, there are two possible
reasons for this neglect-one substantive and one methodological .8 2
The substantive claim is that one may believe that there is no real
substantive content to fairness. 83 If fairness concerns are really just
charades for self-interest then there is no need to account for fairness
needs separately. The methodological claim is simply this-things
just get too complicated when theorists must take into account
the means of the offered shares is approximately 40 percent); Alvin E. Roth et al., Bargaining
and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubjana. Pittsburgh, And Tokyo: An Experimental Study,
81 Am. ECON. REv. 1068, 1070 (1991); Blearden, supra note 79, at 5-7.
81 Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 77, at S286.
82 Id
83 Id
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fairness calculations.8 If the benefit of economic modeling is
answers, the more factors, the more complicated the model, the harder
those answers are to come by.
Taking the methodological rationale first, we simply believe that
this factor cannot be ignored. Legal economists are presumably
making policy recommendations that they believe should become the
law. The calculations may be complicated. However, if a theorist is
going to advocate for a particular position as the welfare-maximizing
one, then that policy should truly-all things considered-maximize
welfare. They cannot assume the can opener.
As for the substantive claim, it seems to us that the burden is on
legal economists to show-through empirical data-that the impact of
fairness is not statistically significant or is simply self-interest in
disguise. However, given the current data that exists, the taste for
fairness runs deep and must be accounted for, not ignored.
Some legal economists attempt to undermine the role of fairness
by explaining our attachment to it. For instance, Harvard legal
economists Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell present a two-step
argument against fairness.85 First, they link fairness theories to social
norms. 86 Here, they assert a causal thesis to explain why the reader is
attracted to fairness, arguing that the attachment to fairness theories
comes from their similarity to social norms that are inborn (via
evolution) or inculcated.8 Second, Kaplow and Shavell argue that
social norms themselves should not provide an independent basis for
making legal policy decisions. They claim that social norms serve as
rules of thumb for advancing social welfare and have evolved or were
indoctrinated for this purpose; hence, because welfare economics can
calculate social welfare directly, reliance on these social norm proxies
is unnecessary.8
There are two problems with this argument. First, a causal
explanation of a belief does not undermine the truth of that belief. As
Jules Coleman noted, "the view that the existence of a causal
explanation of the fact that someone holds or asserts a particular
claim undermines the truth of the claim asserted simply cannot be
sustained.",89 Indeed, as Coleman notes, even if evolution selected for
84 Id.
85 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 63, at 3-5, 63, 136-39, 357-59.
86 Id at 63, 134-38, 204, 207, 242.
87 Id at 136-37, 357-58.
88 Id at 68-72. Richard Posner has also offered an evolutionary explanation of fairness
preferences. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998).
89 Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 1531 (2003) (book
review).
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beliefs, why would it select for false beliefs over true ones?90 Second,
Kaplow and Shavell's move from the observation that social norms
enhance welfare to the claim that they were inculcated for this
purpose is a non sequitur.9 ' There are other alternative explanations
for why fairness beliefs may often be welfare enhancing. Fairness
beliefs and social norms may be linked by a common morality,
and, even if not aimed at maximizing welfare, it would be a very
short-lived morality that did not somehow enhance it.
Ultimately, taking Kaplow and Shavell's claim to its logical
conclusion would lead to a complete refusal to count fairness at all .9
Although Kaplow and Shavell claim to be willing to include fairness
as a preference (when empirically demonstrated, though they doubt
this will often be the case)' 9 3 their argument-that fairness is just a
rough proxy for a welfare-enhancing standard-amounts to an
argument that fairness is just a mistaken preference. That is, people,
were they to know how a legal rule would affect them, would no
longer prefer the fair rule. However, given that Kaplow and Shavell.
claim that mistaken preferences are not entitled to any weight' 94 it
seems that they cannot give any weight to fairness.
111. THE PERILS OF IGNORING FAIRNESS
In this section we argue that when theorists fail to take fairness
into account, their results may not be welfare maximizing. The rule
itself may not maximize welfare because it defeats reasonable
expectations or even instigates resistance. Additionally, the legal rule
may have significant negative externalities-it may undermine the
legal system as a whole.
A. The Failure of the Legal Rule to Maximize Social Welfare
1. Defeating Reasonable Expectations
For small-scale transactions, those where the value does not justify
paying for sophisticated legal assistance, the participants are likely to
rely primarily on their intuitions as to the content of the governing
background rules. 95 At the time they enter into their transaction, both
90 Id at 1534.
91 Ferzan, supra note 67, at 93.
92 See idat 95-10 1.
93 KAPLOW & SHAvELL, supra note 63, at 11-12, 78, 431-36.
94 Idat 23.
95 Such transactions are vital to the economy. In the first eight months of 2008, for
example, personal consumption expenditures amounted to an annualized rate of some
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parties likely think the governing rule is the intuitive rule. That rule
allocates rights to the parties in a way they both understand and
consider to be fair. They build the transaction around the rule as they
think it to be, and price the deal accordingly. They also take whatever
steps they think prudent to ensure performance and to insure against
risk based on their understanding of how the law will allocate each
party's rights and duties.
However, if the parties later have a dispute arising from the
transaction, the court will declare victory for one party over the other
on the basis of the actual legal rule in effect. When the legal rule
produces a different result from the rule the parties thought applied,
their preparations are likely to go awry. Plus, the surprised victor will
gain a windfall at the expense of the dismayed loser. The parties agree
to the contract price with a common understanding that they are
allocating certain entitlements to each. When the court reverses the
parties' distribution, it essentially forces the losing party to pay for
the entitlement twice: once as part of the contract price and a second
time as damages from the litigation.9
Although high-value transactions guided by expensive counsel
seem less vulnerable to this phenomenon, rules governing obscure or
rare aspects of the transaction may suffer from a similar dynamic.
Even experienced lawyers are unlikely to be aware of rules that cover
relatively rare situations. A lawyer uncertain about the law could
expend resources in research to discover the truth, but that search will
occur only when the lawyer is aware of his or her ignorance. In the
more likely situation in which a lawyer is unaware that a special
exception exists, that exception may be ignored until it is too late,
again defeating expectations.
To understand this dynamic more concretely, imagine that a state
adopted a law reinstating the doctrine of caveat emptor (buyer
beware) for a narrow class of contracts only. say contracts dealing
with the sale of used cars by used car dealers. Ignoring the
expectation problems described in this section, such a rule might be
efficient. In such sales, both parties can easily be placed on roughly
equal footing. While the seller possesses more information about the
car's history, that advantage can easily be eliminated by the buyer's
$10 trillion. See Press Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Personal Income and Outlays:
August 2008, at 7 (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/
nationa1IpiI2008/Pdf/piOR08.pdf
96 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 759-63 (noting efficiency complexities once one
drops the assumption that contracting parties are fuilly informed of the operative legal rule).
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hiring a mechanic to inspect the car or making the sale contingent on
a complete disclosure of the car's maintenance records. In this
context, then, there may not be any great need to overcome legal
economists' usual presumption, illustrated by all three of our
introductory examples, that freedom of contract should triumph over
any regulatory impulses to protect one side or the other in a
transaction. Our claim is not that such a rule would actually be
efficient-we can certainly see some arguments that alternative rules
might be better, such as the advantages of imposing liability on the
party with more information ex ante-but only that there are
sufficiently strong arguments in its favor that it is reasonable to
suppose it might be efficient.
Once we consider the rule's effects on settled expectations,
however, the rule's efficiency becomes much more doubtful. For
example, in the last few generations, American consumers have
increasingly come to expect a certain level of fairness protection in
their transactions, especially in their transactions with relatively
sophisticated counterparties. In fact, this caveat emptor proposal
would represent a significant change in the existing law of most
states. The sale of a car is regulated by Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, since cars are movable goods.9 Article 2 applies
certain implied warranties in the absence of express disclaimers.9
One of these is the Implied Warranty of Merchantability, which
provides that, unless excluded, a warranty is implied in the sale of
goods by a merchant (such as a used car dealer) that the goods will be
"merchantable," meaning essentially that they are fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used.99 Many states provide even
more protection in the form of "lemon laws," which provide enhanced
remedies when dealers sell consumers cars that are in particularly
poor shape and cannot be adequately repaired.' 00 The proposed caveat
emptor rule, by contrast, would not imply any warranties at all.
Instead, the background default rule would provide that buyers of
97 See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977) (stating that Article 2 applies to contracts for the sale of
goods); id § 2-105 (defining goods as all things that are movable, with certain exceptions not
relevant here).
98 See, e.g., id § 2-314 (Merchantability); id. § 2-315 (Fitness for a Particular Purpose).
- Id. § 2-314.
"'0'See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-20A-2 (LexisNexis 2002) (stating that dealer must refund
purchase price and pay any damages for car that cannot be brought into conformity with express
warranties); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1793.22-25 (West 1998 & Supp. 2009) (same); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 681.10-118 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009) (same); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 198-a
(McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2009) (same). For a more complete list, see Car Lemon, Lemon Law
Statutes, http://www.carlemon.comi/lemonstat.htmnl (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
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used cars took them on a strictly "as-is" basis, even if they turned out
not to run.
The caveat emptor rule, then, would represent a sharp diversion
from consumers' current expectations. Consumers buying used cars
from dealers expect a certain level of basic protection. While at one
time this may not have been true-witness the still lingering
reputation of used car dealers as untrustworthy-we suspect Article 2
and the passage of lemon laws in many states have largely changed
consumers' expectations. Consumers now are much less likely to take
precautions when buying a used car from a dealer, such as having the
car inspected by a mechanic or insisting on a written warranty.
Should the law change to a regime of caveat emptor, these consumers
would go unprotected and often end up with a "lemon" without
recourse against the dealer. Over time, consumer groups might
manage to educate the public about the new need to take greater care,
but until then (and for many consumers, even after then), consumers
as a group would likely suffer a substantial loss from the adoption of
the new rule. This loss detracts greatly from the proposal's efficiency,
perhaps enough to outweigh whatever gains might be made from the
increased freedom of contract. At a minimum, legal economists have
paid insufficient attention to the effect on settled expectations, an
important factor in measuring a proposal's efficiency.
2. Instigating Resistance
Legal economists tend to think of people's attitudes towards rules
as reflective of their underlying pecuniary interests. Corporations care
about maximizing their profits; individuals care about maximizing
their income. Both corporations and individuals will support policies
that enhance their financial prospects and oppose those policies
that will likely cause them economic harm. But actual human beings
often care most about concerns that are entirely non-pecuniary and
will sometimes willingly suffer financial losses in order to further
other interests. 101 Although it would be trite to state this in any
non-economic context, human beings often care deeply about justice,
J01 See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood Influence Moral Judgment? An Empirical Test
With Legal and Policy Implications, 29 LAW & PSCYHOL. REv. 1, 5 (2005) (stating that
behavioral economists have documented behavior that violates economic norms when subjects
perceive unfair behavior); John Bronsteen et al., Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of civil
Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1516, 1524 (2008) (arguing that since people often act against
their interest in the ultimatum game, they care about values other than economic self-interest,
such as fairness).
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equality, freedom, fairness, and religion, to name but a few of
humanity's core non-pecuniary concerns. 102
Non-pecuniary interests are often the most powerful motivators of
human behavior, and social engineers, such as legal economists,
ignore them at their peril. In particular, individuals who find a
particular law offensive may actively attempt to circumvent it and
undermine its enforcement even when such opposition is costly. This
behavior may impair the efficiency benefits that would come from
broad compliance.
As an example of this problem, let us imagine that
Congress adopted Richard Epstein's proposal to eliminate the
antidiscrimination statutes. Epstein argued that permitting
discrimination would be efficient mostly because it would permit
companies to reduce agency costs. 103 He posited that some companies
would choose to hire primarily members of a particular race as a way
to unify workers' tastes and make the business easier to govern.'0
Other companies that did not discriminate would also benefit from
this rule, because the discriminating companies would siphon off
most of the bigots, who presumably are difficult to manage in racially
diverse companies. 05
But what would actually happen to a company that adopted an
expressly discriminatory hiring policy? Anti-discrimination norms
have taken deep roots in the past two generations. Under these
conditions, who would do business with a company that blatantly
discriminated in hiring? Even a company that adopted its
discrimination policy quietly would risk exposure every time an
applicant of a disfavored race was rejected despite excellent
qualifications. In fact, it would be difficult for a company to reap the
benefits Epstein identified without making some public statement of
its policy, so that members of the favored race would know to apply
in greater numbers (not to mention the bigots). Once a company's
discrimination policy was revealed to the public, it would no doubt
face immediate public condemnation and boycotts organized by
groups representing the excluded races. Indeed, the boycotts would
likely be joined by groups representing every race and religious
group, since no race (and no representative group) would want to be
seen as condoning racial discrimination. It is difficult to imagine that
102 Ed Diener & Martin E.P. Seligman, Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of
Well-Being, 5 PSYCHOL. SC. IN PUB. INT. 1, 6-7 (2004) (noting that form of government,
trusting communities, and religion increase well-being).
103 See EpsTEN, supra note 6, at 61-69.
104 See id. at 63-69.
105 See id at 74.
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any company that stuck to an expressly discriminatory hiring policy
could long survive, regardless of the policy's legality. The apparent
efficiencies Epstein argued could be gained evaporate once we take
into account people's likely resistance to laws they strongly
oppose. 106
Epstein's proposal represents perhaps an extreme, in that nearly
everyone at least publicly expresses opposition to racial
discrimination. Other proposals might be less universally condemned
and therefore receive less effusive opposition. But our point holds
true for any policy that a sizable group passionately disapproves of on
principled grounds. A sufficiently outraged opposition will take steps
to undermine the law it disputes, even when such opposition's
expensc far outweighs any anticipated material benefits from a policy
change.' 07 The resulting costs should be taken into account when
determining if a proposed law is truly welfare maximizing.
B. The Hidden Externalities of Unfair Rules: Undermining Moral
Norms and Legitimacy
1. Why Citizens Obey the Law
Why do people obey the law? This question poses a difficult
puzzle, especially for economists. For example, there are many goods
and services we would very much enjoy consuming but which, as
academics, we cannot easily afford. Why do we refrain from simply
taking them? Why, in short, do we obey the law prohibiting us from
stealing?
Economists' answers focus on deterrence. The law induces
obedience by establishing appropriate incentives. We obey the law
because the law ensures that it is in our interests to do so.' 08 The law
10 Esti might contend that our analysis proves his point, that laws forbidding racial
discrimination are unnecessary, since the same result-nondiscriminatory hiring-can be
achieved without them. But this is not how he justified his argument in Forbidden Grounds.
Instead, there he relied on the efficiencies that would result from permitting discrimination. See
EPSTEIN, supra note 6. More importantly, our purpose is not to argue the merits of any
particular policy proposal but to demonstrate that legal economists frequently overlook the
important consequences that result from individuals' strong opposition to some legal rules.
107 See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLuM. L.
Rnv. 1641, 1664 (2003) ("[A] substantial number of the experimental subjects are willing to
punish unfair behavior even though the action is costly to them."); see also Larry E. Ribstein,
Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 209, 233 (citing experimental evidence that
people reward fair behavior and punish unfair behavior).
108 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
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can set up these incentives either by promising rewards for
compliance or by threatening punishment for disobedience.
The law's success in coaxing obedience depends on the credibility
of the threatened punishment, which in turn hinges on both the
likelihood of detection and the magnitude of punishment. 09 If we
believe we are almost certain to be caught and punished, we are much
less likely to steal than if we believe we are likely to escape with the
stolen goods. Deterrence is costly. To make the threat of punishment
credible, a government must invest heavily in police, courts, and
prisons, both to increase the perceived risk of capture and to actually
imprison those who are caught and convicted. For this reason,
economists' vision of the law's goal is not necessarily to achieve
perfect deterrence-and therefore perfect obedience-but rather to
find the point at which the next dollar spent on deterring crime yields
less than one dollar's worth of crime prevention. 11 The goal, in other
words, is an efficient level of crime.
Though the workings of deterrence are fine in theory, in practice
an efficient level of crime is elusive. As Paul Robinson and John
Darley have documented, there is little reason to believe that criminal
law deters (at least through this mathematical formula).' Given the
low chances of being caught, convicted, and sentenced to prison, the
prison sentence itself is unlikely to have a strong deterrent effect.
Indeed, although economists believe that citizens obey the law
because they are threatened into obedience, other scholars who have
studied this question take a broader view of the possible causes
of obedience."1 2 Sociologists, social psychologists, and political
scientists argue that important factors in addition to deterrence
include peer attitudes towards crime, internal moral norms, and the
legitimacy of the government institutions that create, administer, and
enforce the law."1 3 Deterrence and peer attitudes are both externally
imposed methods of achieving obedience, whereas internal moral
norms and legitimacy are internally motivated sources of
compliance."14 These four sources of obedience are interrelated, so
1091d. at 176.
"10See id. at 170; see also Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of
Criminal Law, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 175, 176 (2005) (reconciling Becker's optimal level of crime
approach with Posner's full deterrence approach).
II I See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 173 (2004).
112 See Tom TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 15 (1990).
113 See generally id.; Mark D. White, A Social Economics of Crime (Based on Kantian
Ethics), in LAW & ECONOMICS: ALTERNATWvE ECONOMIC APPROACHES To LEGAL AND
REGULATORY ISSUES 351 (Margaret Oppenheimer & Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2005); Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1997).
114 See TYLER, supra note 112, at 23-26.
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that a change in one may have a greater or lesser impact through
resulting changes in the others.
In some cases, deterrence is a factor. Material incentives are an
important determinant of human behavior. Not surprisingly, because
economists favor deterrence, incentives are the factor least likely to
be directly affected by the choice of counterintuitive or apparently
unfair rules. As long as the incentives are clear and well-known, they
should tend to make the desired behavior more likely (and the
undesired behavior less likely). But the results frequently will be less
straightforward than economists predict, depending on the remaining
three factors.
Peer attitudes towards compliance with the law, in contrast, may
tend to undermine obedience of rules that are surprising or seem
unfair. Tom Tyler's seminal Chicago study of legal adherence
demonstrates that people distinguish among different laws when
asked whether their peers would disapprove if they were arrested for
committing one of a series of crimes.' Although only about half of
respondents felt that their peers would disapprove if they were
arrested for making too much noise, littering, speeding, or parking
illegally, the vast majority of respondents predicted their peers would
disapprove if they were arrested for drunk driving (86 percent) or
shoplifting (89 percent).' 1 6 Tyler's study showed that anticipated peer
attitudes vary with the seriousness or moral blameworthiness of the
crime. Crimes that appear less blameworthy, either because they
cause less harm or do not violate a core moral precept, gamner less
peer censure than those likely to cause great harm (such as drunk
driving) or to violate fundamental moral principles (such as the
prohibition against theft). Laws that outlaw conduct that appears
harmless or innocent are unlikely to provoke much peer criticism
when they are violated. These rules are consequently less likely to be
obeyed. Economists who focus solely on material incentives in
predicting compliance will therefore greatly overstate the likelihood
of observance of counterintuitive or seemingly unfair rules.
Like peer attitudes, internal moral norms are less likely to lead to
enforcement of odd or immoral laws. Tyler's Chicago study
demonstrates that most people feel that breaking the law is morally
wrong, and that this is one of the major reasons why people tend to
obey the law. 117 To the extent people do not feel a particular law
parallels their personal morality, then, internal moral norms are far
115See id. at 44.
116 See id
117 See id at 56.
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less likely to induce compliance.' 18  This effect should prove
particularly powerful when people believe a law opposes their
morality. We see a dramatic example of this effect in abortion foes
who bomb clinics. Although they know that destruction of property is
illegal, they proceed because they believe their actions serve a higher
moral purpose: that of preventing what they perceive to be legally
sanctioned murder. They choose to violate laws they presumably
agree with (those banning destruction of others' property) in order to
prevent enforcement of laws they virulently oppose (those legalizing
abortion). Although this is an extreme example, it does illustrate the
guiding principle: people are less likely to obey a law that is not
reinforced by their internal moral norms.
The fourth and final source of obedience comes from a law's
legitimacy. "Legitimacy" refers to the perceived obligation to obey.' 19
Citizens may feel an obligation to obey a law or a legal authority
(such as a leader, judge, or police officer) when that law or authority
stems from a process or institution that they feel creates an adequate
justification for obedience.120 For example, Americans may feel that a
statute passed by both the House and the Senate and signed by the
President should be obeyed even if they disagree with the statute's
substance. The institutions that promulgated the law are rooted in a
principle-representational democracy-that most Americans feel
rightly demands their obedience. As a result, those institutions have a
great deal of legitimacy in American political culture and can often
induce compliance even from those who dissent from particular
policy decisions.
Legitimacy is a variable sociological characteristic, however, not a
physical constant. The legitimacy of sources of law and those who
enforce it may decline if the laws seem wrong or bizarre. As a result,
people may stop obeying even laws that do not seem strange because
the overall legitimacy of the system is undermined. Sociological
studies support this notion that those who oppose the decisions of
legal institutions also feel those institutions are less legitimate.'12'
118 The Chicago Study also found that the vast majority of respondents said that people
should obey a law even if it goes against what they think is right. Id at 46. This finding,
however, must be read in conjunction with the studies that demonstrate that this measure of
legitimacy declines among people who disagree with the government's substantive policy
choices. See infra note 121.
19 See TYLER, supra note 112, at 27-28; MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 124-26 (A. M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947).
'
20 See TYLER, supra note 112, at 28.
121 See id. at 30; see also Anke Grosskopf & Jeffery J. Mondak, Do Attitudes Toward
Specific Supreme Court Decisions Matter? The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on
Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 633, 647 (1998); Valerie J. Hoekstra,
The Supreme Court and Local Public Opinion, 94 Am. POL. SCI. REv. 89, 96-98 (2000); Walter
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Legitimacy thus provides some maneuvering room for governmental
agents to advance policies that may not be popular, but legitimacy is
ultimately linked to a government's ability to fulfill its people's
desires.122 A government that advances laws that appear immoral or
strange may find its legitimacy undermined. Legal economists should
consider these risks when arguing for such proposals, because the
harmful effects on the government's legitimacy may far outweigh any
marginal efficiency gained by adopting counterintuitive rules.
Counterintuitive and/or unfair rules may sometimes prove welfare
maximizing. But that calculation is far more complex than most legal
economists have heretofore acknowledged. Such rules may have
nuanced effects on social welfare through their effect on expectations,
their conflict with non-pecuniary interests, and their deleterious
impact on citizens' tendency to obey the law.
Applying the findings of Tyler and others, Paul Robinson and John
Darley contend that the criminal law is best served by conforming to
citizens' perceptions of just desert. 123 As they argue, criminal law
serves an essential function in both shaping and enforcing moral
norms. 124 When citizens perceive a rule to be unfair, this may
undermine the criminal law's legitimacy and the willingness of
citizens to defer to the law in unclear cases. 22' As Robinson and
Darley forcefully argue, legal economists' prescriptions to deviate
from desert are far from costless, and may instead significantly
undermine crime control.126
2. The "Flouting Thesis"
Very little has been done to test the empirical assumption that
unfair rules will undermine overall faith in the justice system. Still, it
seems that any theorist who argues that his counterintuitive rule is
efficient is implicitly (albeit unwittingly) making the claim that, even
taking into account the extent to which this rule undermines citizen
respect for the law, it is still the best rule. And, because the legal
economist is making such a claim, the burden lies on the economist to
F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court:
Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Change, 2 L. & Soc'y REV.
357, 374-77 (1968).
122Se TYLER, supra note 112, at 30.
123 Robinson & Darley, supra note 113. at 454.
124 1Id. at 457.
125 Id. at 487.126Id. at 478.
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address and to refute any arguments that this rule will be more
detrimental than beneficial.
Moreover, preliminary research does confirm that the legal
economist must take these concerns seriously. One theorist who has
attempted to understand the extent to which an unfair rule will
undermine overall faith in the system is Janice Nadler. 27 Nadler
recently examined the assumed but unproven "Flouting Thesis."
"When a person evaluates particular legal rules, decisions, or
practices as unjust," she explained, "the diminished respect for the
legal system that follows can destabilize otherwise law-abiding
behavior. 128
in one experiment, subjects were exposed to many newspaper
stories including a series of stories that portrayed laws as just or
unjust. 12 9 Then, for an ostensibly unrelated purpose, the subjects were
asked to participate in filling out a questionnaire on their likelihood of
criminal behavior.13 0 The questionnaire listed "borderline"~ crimes
such as drinking underage, taking home office supplies for personal
use, and making illegal copies of software. 331 As predicted, those
subjects exposed to stories discussing unjust laws indicated a greater
willingness to break the law than those exposed to news stories about
just laws.'312
Nadler also conducted two experiments involving mock trials. In
the first experiment, undergraduate students served as subjects.133
They watched a news story that depicted either a just or an unjust
outcome.134 They were then asked to participate in a (supposedly
unrelated) mock trial.135 In this mock trial, the defendant stole a
shopping cart and was clearly guilty; however, subjects also knew
that, because this was his third felony, the defendant would receive a
life sentence with no possibility of parole.136 In this study, the
Flouting Thesis was not confirmed. There was no statistically
significant correlation between the just or unjust prime and the
decision to nullify. 3
127 See Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1399 (2005).
128 Id. at 1401.
129M. at 1411-12.
1301d. at 1413-14.
131Id at 1414.
132 Id at 1415.
133 Id at 1417.
135M. at 1418.
137M.d at 1420.
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Nadler then conducted the study with different participants. She
sent an email to over a thousand participants, ultimately yielding
subjects that were 60 percent female, 82 percent white, and had a
mean age of 37, with 66 percent of the subjects residing in the United
States.138 These subjects read the news story (rather than watching it
on television) and then read a description of the mock trial, and were
asked for their verdicts.13 9 Under these conditions, the Flouting Thesis
was confirmed.140
There is certainly more empirical work to be done. Nadler' s
research confirms, however, that the "Flouting Thesis" is not just a
matter of theoretical concern. Unfair rules may ultimately undermine
the law itself.
Let us return to the proposals with which we began. Imagine that
laws were enacted that allowed for baby selling, discrimination, and
insider trading. We now see that these sorts of laws may undermine
the law's overall legitimacy. If most people believe that
discrimination is acutely wrongfuil, then they will view the law as
making a profound moral mistake in allowing for discrimination. As
mentioned above, it is entirely possible that they would then be less
willing to defer to the law as a source of moral advice when they are
unsure of what to do. Thus, even if these laws are welfare maximizing
in the individual case, they may ultimately have significant external
costs that do not render them welfare maximizing when considering
the legal system as a whole.
3. Undermnining Rule of Law Values
There is one final way in which the law may lose its power. The
legal rule may undermine the social norm and the fairness belief
itself. That is, even assuming that Kaplow and Shavell are correct and
fairness rules are but imperfect proxies for complex social welfare
standards, the economist cannot ignore the value of having rules.'14 '
When legal economists urge that we look beyond fairness beliefs to
see whether, in any particular case, a rule is maximizing, they are
choosing between the value of rules and the value of standards. This
trade-off must also be accounted for in their calculations.
The rules versus standards question is perhaps most famously
embodied in the debate between Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and
Benjamin Cardozo. To Justice Holmes, the "featureless generality" of
138 Id. at 1423.
1391d. at 1424.
140Jd at 1424-25.
141 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
622 [V l  59:3
2009] THE PERILS OF FORGETTING FAIRNESS62
negligence would ultimately give way to specific per se rules, such as
"stop, look, and listen."142 But Justice Cardozo had the last word,
holding that such per se rules could not take into account all the
circumstances so as to adjudicate negligence liability correctly in
future cases.143
There are values to having rules as opposed to standards.'"4 First,
rules can solve physical coordination problems. In situations in which
there are several different (and incompatible) ways to resolve a
problem (for example, which side of the street to drive on), a rule can
offer a solution.44' Rules can also solve social coordination problems.
To the extent that the morally right thing to do turns in part on what
others are likely to do (for instance, a prisoner's dilemma), rules
provide a basis for prediction.'4
But rules have other values as well. The rule promulgator
may have greater moral or factual knowledge than a citizen.'147
Additionally, rules help avert errors. When a complex decision must
be made, actors who must decide under a standard-analyzing a
multitude of factors-may simply get the calculations wrong.14 8 And,
by having a rule, decision-making costs are reduced.14 9 As Larry
Alexander and Emily Sherwin have explained, "[t]he quality that
identifies a rule and distinguishes it from a standard is the quality
of determinateness. . . . [A] rule is a posited norm that fulfills the
function of posited norms, that is, that settles questions of what ought
to be done." 5 0
As just one example, consider speed limits. If a law simply said,
"drive safely," individual citizens would have to calculate at what
speed to drive. Some would drive faster than they should because
they would miscalculate the safe speed. Hence, the government tells
citizens to drive fifty-five miles per hour because (1) it has more
factual information and (2) ex ante it is less likely to make mistakes
than an individual driver at the time he is driving. The speed limit rule
'
4 2 See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927); OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 111 (188 1).
143 Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934).
'"4See generally LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES:
MORALITY, RULES, & THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 11-25 (2001); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING
BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW
AND IN LIFE (199 1).
145See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 144, at 56; SCHAUER, supra note 144,
162-66.
'46see ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, Supra note 144, at 57-58.
147 SCHAUER, supra note 144, at 55.
148M.d at 150.
149Id at 13 7.
150 ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 144, at 3 0.
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is thus an imperfect proxy (imperfect because some people may
safely drive at fifty-six miles per hour) for the general standard to
"drive safely."
Despite the values of rules, the problem is that rules may be
over-inclusive. 1 5'1 This is, of course, Kaplow and Shavell's
complaint. 152 If the standard is welfare maximization, and a fairness
rule is but a rough proxy, the rule may sometimes be wrong.15 3
Interestingly, however, rules are effective only because citizens do
not frequently question whether they should follow a rule in any
particular case.'154
For our purposes, what is essential to note is that even iffairness
rules only serve a proxy function, undermining that function may
have devastating effects in cases in which we want citizens to follow
the rule. Ultimately, the value of legal rules is consequentialist. We
pursue the Good through indirect rules, rather than through direct
calculations, because we are more likely to achieve the Good
indirectly. 155 Thus, the stability of these sorts of rules is required for
us to be able to achieve the Good in the vast majority of cases.'15 6
Hence, even if the underlying consequentialist standard (assuming
this is what underlies the rule, of course) dictates that discrimination,
or cheating, or baby selling is the appropriate course in one specific
set of circumstances, this sort of deviation from the norms of fairness
and equality may undermine the value of the rules themselves. A
legal economist cannot afford to ignore such consequences.
In other words, once legal economists teach citizens to look behind
the rule for the action that is welfare maximizing in the individual
case then citizens will begin to disregard rules and make their own
calculations in other cases. But this defeats the very purpose of
having rules, which serve the very purpose of avoiding individual
calculations and mistakes. If "don't cheat" becomes "it is okay to
cheat sometimes," then society loses the benefit of the social norm
against cheating and it may encourage citizens to make their own
(often mistaken) calculations in other instances as well.
Is5I Rules may also be underinclusive. That is, the reason that justifies prohibiting conduct
type a may also extend to conduct type b, but the rule may apply only to conduct type a.
SCHAUER, supra note 144, at 32-33.
152 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 63, at 244.
153 ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 144, at 35; SCHAUER, supra note 144, at 32.
154 See generally Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1994).
155See Larry Alexander, Pursuing the Good--Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315, 3 17-19 (1985)
(arguing that we need "indirect consequentialism" because for some practices pursuing the good
directly would be self-defeating).
56 This still creates the paradox of what to do when the rule does not promote the Good in
an individual case. See id. at 319-2 1.
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have sought to urge legal economists to take
fairness concerns seriously. There is robust evidence that individuals
have a preference for fair rules. Without taking these strong
preferences into account, a legal economist cannot be sure that his
proposal is actually welfare maximizing. Moreover, even if a
proposal is discretely maximizing, an unfair rule may do significant
damage to the value of the rule of law itself. In the face of this
empirical evidence, legal economists who fail to take fairness
preferences into account are ignoring a variable essential to their
calculations.
Perhaps the failure to include fairness concerns reflects the legal
economists' fear that so doing would be to abdicate their calculators
for armchairs. The economist, who seeks data, may find the prospect
of navel gazing about fairness to be the antithesis of his discipline.
But the legal economist need not fear. Rather, just as the legal
economist may wish to empirically discover the best legal rule, he
may also empirically test the strength of individuals' tastes for
fairness. Indeed, some studies have found that the citizenry's taste for
fairness (or lack thereof) may not coincide with initial expectations.15 7
But it is time for the legal economist to get empirical. He cannot
afford to lie on the beach, dreaming of can openers. He is starving.
157 Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 77, at S295.
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